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**REMARKS**

Don:

Attached is the first cut at a paper for you to give to the DDCI refuting NAPA's allegations about the excessive costs that we incur in administering CIA's personnel system. I have not shared this as yet with either [redacted] but will do so at your pleasure. I might note that I mentioned this suggestion to [redacted] after you and I discussed it last Thursday and have not heard back from him.

I have attached for your reference the two memos Ben prepared on this subject.

I am available to discuss this with you further and rewrite it as you feel appropriate.

[redacted]

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FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
[redacted]	7C18 HQS
Management Staff/DDA	Phone No.
	[redacted]

1. NAPA commented in its final report about the inordinately high costs to CIA of administering its personnel system. On the one hand, NAPA commends us for the overall quality of our personnel system and on the other hand, suggests that we pay too high a price for what we have achieved. You and I have been around this government of ours long enough to know that what the CIA has achieved through its personnel management system--highly intelligent, well trained, unusually motivated, and extremely productive employees--is a precious accomplishment and has not been achieved anywhere else in government on the scale achieved by CIA. One of the quickest ways to establish mediocrity in CIA, it seems to me, is to begin to dismantle the personnel system that has been so productive. One of the reasons CIA people perform so well is because they know they have a personnel system that will give them a fair shot at the rewards available for good performance. Where else in government have you consistently seen the level of performance achieved by CIA people?

2. NAPA claims that CIA's ratio of employees involved in personnel administration to total employees is 1 in 16, compared to "other federal agencies which are well staffed" which have a ratio of 1 in 60 or more. The formula and data used in arriving at the CIA ratio is fraught with error and inconsistency. NAPA includes all Personnel careerists and the entire Office of Training [ ] in calculating their ratio, and this is patently unfair. My own gross calculation says that a fair CIA ratio is at least 1 in 39, and when I compare what the CIA personnel system has achieved with other agencies around town, I say the accomplishment is well worth it, at twice the price. In arriving at my ratio of 1 in 39, I am deleting [ ] of the Office of Training and [ ] Office of Personnel positions as being nonapplicable because they represent the satisfaction of unique CIA responsibilities not found elsewhere in government, (e.g., tradecraft training, and the protection of intelligence sources and methods). I go on to eliminate 40 work-years of panel effort and 55 non-Personnel work-years because both are directly related to an organization that operates on a worldwide basis and which must do so almost entirely in a secure manner:

Personnel Careerists  
Office of Training (1)  
Panels (in work-years)  
Non-Personnel Careerists Performing  
Personnel Functions in Components

NAPA Wortman

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STAT In arriving at the ratio of 1 in 16, NAPA divided their estimate of [ ] which evidently was the total of all full-time permanent personnel on board at the time of their estimate. I suggest, however, that we must use as a base the total number of personnel in CIA who are administered--which includes all temporary/part-time personnel in addition to just full-time, permanent people. Using 1979 numbers, I suggest that there were a total of [ ] people being administered (not the [ ] as NAPA states) by our personnel system--of which I suggest that [ ] are comparable with a "well-staffed" federal agency. The result is a CIA ratio of 1 in 39, not 1 in 16 as NAPA suggests. ~~Given what I suggest is the inaccuracy of NAPA's ratio for CIA, I suggest that its 1 in 60 ratio for other agencies may be equally suspect and that in fact CIA may be very comparable with other federal agencies in terms of the number of work years involved in administering a personnel system.~~ ST

3. I feel strongly that NAPA has done CIA a serious disservice in its criticism about the cost of administering its personnel system--particularly when several of its recommendations for improvement will involve an even greater commitment of people to the administration of CIA personnel, if implemented.

4. The NAPA Study Group is reviewing this matter in greater detail and will provide its detailed findings shortly. In the meantime, I felt compelled to object to the NAPA finding. Perhaps others in CIA are unable to compare the CIA personnel system with those developed by other federal agencies--and to go on and compare what each achieves. I have the advantage of having served elsewhere in government--as have you--and I know that what the CIA system has produced is invaluable and--once lost--irreplaceable. We should not treat this matter lightly, as serious and very lasting equities are at stake. The quality of intelligence in the CIA may well be impacted to a larger degree by the CIA personnel system than by the sum of all other factors combined (i.e., enhanced training, automated support, overseas experience, and the like).